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The Chinese private sector maintains complex links with the interests and organs of the Communist Party of China (CPC). In this paper, we argue that party committees offer the CPC a mechanism for harnessing a latent source of potential national energy. This energy can be directed towards solving crises, addressing long-term challenges, and deterring private enterprises from opposing the party. But the party also positions these party committees as being mutually-beneficial, creating workers and executives who increase firm productivity even as they respond to political incentives. Recent personnel moves at the 20th Party Congress suggest the party is shifting economic gravity towards leveraging relationships with the business sector and being even more involved with the direction of capital. We believe that this echoes earlier days of the CPC, where practices such as mass-line supervision, grassroots mobilization, and the danwei (单位) system all gave the party direct mechanisms of involvement with the people. All of this suggests efforts to build an enhanced capability to direct China’s economic activity. The article begins by providing some background information on party committees and their reemergence in the private sector. We then examine the current literature before offering a framework to orient the reader to our presentation of empirical data. We assessed 40 private Chinese enterprises for indicators of party committee activity. From those, we highlight four companies for in-depth analysis. A brief discussion offers concluding implications for further study and policy relevance.