Competing Verdicts: Multiple Election Monitors and Post-Election Contention

• In Event: Election Observation and Public Confidence in Elections

Abstract

By influencing beliefs about electoral quality, international election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention. As the number and variety of EOMs has grown, however, many elections host multiple groups and disagreement among these missions is common. This phenomenon of competing EOM verdicts is particularly prevalent in electoral authoritarian regimes, as leaders seek to invite “friendly” monitors to counteract possible criticism from more established election monitoring organizations. Drawing from research about the varying domestic credibility of EOMs and the demobilizing effects of disinformation, we argue that competing verdicts increase uncertainty about electoral quality, which in turn dampens post-election mobilization. Using newly available data on EOM verdicts as reported in the international media, we show that competing verdicts reduce post-election contention in a sample of 119 developing countries from 1990-2012. A survey experiment in Turkey lends support to the micro foundations of these findings. Our findings provide the first systematic evidence in support of the idea that governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the risk of criticism.

Authors

• Daniela Donno, University of Oklahoma

• Kelly Elizabeth Morrison, University of Tennessee, Knoxville

• Burcu Savun, University of Pittsburgh

• Perisa Davutoglu, University of Pittsburgh