Structural Incentives for Politicians to Manipulate Domestic Opinions

• In Event: (Affective) Polarization, Policy and Democratic Support

Abstract

How do structural incentives influence politicians’ choices to manipulate public opinion in democracies? Research shows that party reputation matters for reelection chances. So, why do parties risk their reputation by using online disinformation as a tool to mobilize voters? I explore this puzzle through a reputational cost theory of disinformation, positing that certain country level features lower elite reputational costs for spreading disinformation. These attributes include societal polarization, media fractionalization, mixed electoral systems and non-compulsory voting. Countries high on these attributes incentivize politicians to use disinformation, because their voters are less likely to punish undemocratic behavior.
I find empirical support for my theory using longitudinal data from the Digital Society Project and Democratic Electoral Systems from 2000-2021. This contributes to the literature on agency-based theories on democratic backsliding.

Author

• Hanna Sistek, Purdue University