Openings for Influence: Security Force Assistance and Civil-Military Relations

• In Event: Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

How does security force assistance affect civil-military relations? Security force assistance (SFA) has become an increasingly prominent instrument of U.S. national security policy, rising 250% from 2001 to 2020, to roughly $20 billion per year. SFA aims to serve national security goals by underpinning alliances, promoting regional stability, and confronting insurgency or terrorism. Yet the effects of SFA remain unclear. Several studies point to perverse effects in exacerbating human rights abuse and heightening the risk of coups d’état. Case studies of major recipients such as Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the inability of donors to influence recipient policy. Still, some SFA recipients, such as Colombia, Ukraine, and Liberia, have adopted major reforms to security institutions that have reinforced civilian control and reined in human rights abuse. Yet we know little about whether and when SFA contributes to institutional change.

This paper examines how conditions in recipient countries moderate the effects of SFA on civil-military relations institutions. Prior research has emphasized the divergence between donor and recipient preferences regarding civil-military relations, and highlighted the limits of donor influence due to insufficient leverage, information asymmetry, and inability to credibly threaten to withdraw. In focusing on donor tactics and organization, this research has devoted less attention to how conditions within recipient states affect possibilities for influence. I examine how internal political conditions lead to varying preferences among recipient elites, and affect the potential for donor influence. Drawing on recent research on civil-military relations, I explore how the nature of elite political networks shape elite preferences regarding oversight and management of armed forces, as well as their potential leverage, information asymmetry, and credibility relative to donors. I posit that elites with more fragmented political networks, who face threats from within their political coalition and security forces, are most likely to depend on external SFA for political survival, leading to greater donor leverage, credibility, and influence. By increasing the value of SFA for leaders’ political survival, fragmented political networks create opportunities for donors to contribute to institutional change.

I probe this argument through a cross-national statistical analysis of U.S. security assistance recipients from 2000-2018 and a comparative analysis of Iraq and Colombia from 2003 to 2014. I find a positive and significant correlation between SFA and increased civilian control when politics are internally fragmented, but not when cohesive networks predominate. In Iraq, the ruling party’s reliance on cohesive sectarian networks limited its dependence on external political support, enabling it to reject U.S. efforts to influence security institutions In Colombia, networks among military and civilian elites fractured, creating an opening for civilian leaders to rein in the autonomy of the military and improve adherence to human rights while drawing on U.S. support. The analysis sheds light on why the U.S. sometimes achieves so little influence despite intensive footprint, and why influence also varies over time within a given country.

These results show that contrary to prevailing wisdom, SFA can contribute to strengthening civilian control and oversight, but its effects depend on internal politics. They contribute to elucidating the effects of SFA as an instrument of statecraft, while showing how internal conditions within low- and middle-income countries moderate its effects. The findings highlight the importance of examining informal networks and mobilization strategies in addition to formal institutions to assess the potential for outside influence.

Author

• Louis-Alexandre Berg, Georgia State University