Ballot Order Manipulation in Russia, Vietnam, and China

• In Event: Voting Behavior and Legislatures: Insights and Implications

Abstract

Theories of authoritarian elections posit a trade-off between certainty and information, but we argue that reputational concerns constitute a neglected third dimension. Noting that recent work finds first-listed parties and candidates receiving a strong vote boost due to their ballot position, we theorize that dictators can harness these ballot order effects to harmonize all three goals -increasing certainty without harming information or sacrificing their reputations. We propose three ways to manipulate ballot order: ballot access manipulation, candidate allocation manipulation, and randomization manipulation. Analyzing Russian, Vietnamese, and Chinese elections where ballot order is ostensibly exogenous, we demonstrate fabricated randomization processes in favor of United Russia. We also find that Vietnam's candidate vetting process skews non-favored candidates toward bottom-of-ballot late-alphabetizers and that these candidates are strategically deployed across electoral districts to benefit regime candidates. In both states, regime favorites see increased vote shares and a higher likelihood of election.

Authors

• Jason Douglas Todd, Duke Kunshan University

• Minh Duc Trinh, Purdue University