State Surveillance of Political Activists: Evidence from 80 Years of Records

• In Event: Frontiers in Historical Political Economy

Abstract

All states adopt systems of surveillance of political activists. How do they decide who to surveil and when? I collect a novel database of individuals subject to political surveillance in Italy in a period spanning democracy and dictatorship (1861-1945). First, while the literature has largely focused on the use of these methods by authoritarian regimes, surveillance peaked right before Fascism, and dropped dramatically once the regime consolidated and became authoritarian. Second, I ask which individual characteristics predict being subject to surveillance. Historical accounts indicate that governments feared individuals embedded in low socioeconomic backgrounds but with higher education than their peers. I test the effect of an increase in education by leveraging a law exogenously increasing mandatory school compliance in cities above a population cutoff in a difference-in-difference framework. This shock to education largely affected individuals in lower classes who might have otherwise dropped out of school. I show that cities treated with this law experience a substantial increase in the number of individuals subject to state surveillance, an effect driven by the lowest classes. These findings suggest that socioeconomic resources -- largely considered as joint determinants of political activation -- are decoupled in the minds of the states: while education can increase activation and efficacy, low economic resources might increase the likelihood of frustration and mobilization, making this combination the most dangerous and highest priority for state surveillance.

Author

• Gemma Dipoppa, Columbia University