Reelection Reform and Removing Rivals in Mexico

• In Event: Studies of Organized Crime and Conflict Mini-Conference: Democracy under Assault: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

What is the effect of introducing reelection on criminal engagement in elections? Examining an electoral reform in Mexico, I argue that reelection can bring stability to the ties between criminal groups and local politicians. Politicians may be incentivized to collude with organized crime to win reelection, and, armed with longer political horizons, the long-term deals they make with criminal groups may be more credible. When one criminal group has a monopoly on illicit power, this collusion may result in lower levels of violence against politicians. On the other hand, reelection also increases the value of office. Where groups compete for control of localities, this can incentivize violence during an election, followed by a period of stability after the winner is established. To test this theory, I exploit the staggered implementation of electoral reform in Mexico. Using a multi-period difference-in-differences design with an original dataset of attacks on local politicians, I find that reelection had a negative effect on violence, regardless of the degree of competition between groups. I also examine other indicators of engagement, such as the number of candidates, concentrations of vote shares, and electoral crimes. Further, I find attacks in municipalities had spillover effects, precipitating attacks nearby. This paper contributes to the larger literature which seeks to understand the interaction of organized crime, politics, and institutional reforms.

Author

• Adee Weller, Emory University