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Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China’s pro-Russia propaganda has generated severe concerns in the West. US State Department claims that Chinese media and officials’ uncritical amplification of Moscow’s narratives demonstrates Beijing’s support for Russia. However, our analysis uncovers a gap between China’s official communication and foreign policy. The policy-propaganda gap is not new but an under-examined pattern in Chinese foreign policy. It is vital to investigate the nuanced policy processes within the Chinese system to understand such a gap. In the case of the Russo-Ukraine war, Chinese official media and rhetoric have leaned toward Russia. Still, Chinese official policies have remained relatively neutral, including in diplomatic, military, and economic domains. We argue that this gap between propaganda and foreign policy can be explained by the complicated bureaucratic pressures that Chinese media and spokespeople face in the context of this war. This analysis sheds new light on domestic sources of China’s foreign policy.