Strategies of Incumbent Survival: New Tradeoffs

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The five empirical papers on this panel explore under-recognized tradeoffs inherent in familiar tools of incumbent survival. Incumbents who seek to ward off threats through franchise extension, censorship, electoral fraud, propaganda, and even violent repression, the authors collectively establish, confront unexpected costs and benefits. Extending the franchise can quell discontent but also stir up new opposition. Censoring one television station can elicit pro-incumbent content from other outlets but also risks alienating newly bored viewers. Using electoral fraud to widen an already winning margin can work for one election but may ultimately backfire, angering previously complacent constituencies. Similarly, an authoritarian regime choosing where to station security agents must weigh the severity of the security threat against the specific agents’ ability to confront it. Even apparent puff pieces about an incumbent can have unintended consequences. New data from France, Venezuela, Mexico, Germany, and Argentina speak to these subtle choices.

Sub Unit

• Division 6: Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Collateral Censorship - Dorothy Kronick, University of California, Berkeley; John Marshall, Columbia University

• Cleaning Votes: An Estimation of Electoral Results in Fraudulent Environments - Francisco Cantu, University of Houston

• Security Personnel, Social Embeddedness, and State Violence - Haley Allen DeMarco, Yale University

• Does Sportswashing Work? First Insights from the 2022 World Cup in Qatar - Christian Gläßel, Hertie School Berlin; Adam Scharpf, University of Copenhagen; Pearce Edwards, Texas Christian University

Chair

• Dorothy Kronick University of California, Berkeley

Discussant

• Tara L Slough New York University