China, Global Economic Engagement, and International Responses

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Autocratic countries often have diverse motivations for engaging with the international economy and global governance institutions, such as attaining greater international recognition and status, constructing obstacles to interference with domestic sovereignty, locking in liberalizing reform trajectories, asserting control over other nations, and aiding modernization efforts through access to global resources. Transnational movements of people and ideas have also shaped the economic system, institutions, and the behavior of firms in the Bretton Woods era and beyond. Cross-border engagement can occur via multiple micro-level linkages, resulting not only in expansions of policymakers’ firsthand experiences but also greater understandings among states of foreign economies and firms.

From at least this wide-ranging set of factors, this panel begins by explaining and clarifying the actions of the People’s Republic of China at various points in time, under conditions of international engagement. Leutert finds that through transnational interaction, Chinese policymakers conduct “policy collaging”: seeking, selecting, and creatively combining policy ideas and practices from multiple international sources, illustrated using a case study of Chinese state-owned enterprise restructuring since the 1970s. Kinkel’s paper uses China’s approach to WTO disputes to examine questions of authoritarian motivation to participate in global governance institutions.

China’s actions in the international sphere have also engendered responses from both great powers and developing countries, demonstrating the effect of security on international engagement with China’s economy. Li focuses on China’s relationship with the United States, finding that Chinese firms are more likely to be targeted by national-security-related trade restrictions (NSTRs) when they are dependent on U.S. firms that control parts of global innovation networks (GINs) that can choke off technology exchange, and when the U.S. government lacks control over its domestic businesses. Mueller-Redwood analyzes the recent trend of developing economies increasing their reserve holdings of the renminbi. While increased trade with China may be one motivating factor for renminbi holdings, Meuller-Redwood argues that it is particularly true that geopolitical considerations play as much of a role in the adoption of reserve currencies as economic considerations, as countries that are in security alliances with China and authoritarian countries are more likely to adopt renminbi reserve policies, and as a result, likely have greater potential to withstand sanctions.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Policy Collaging: Transnationalizing Analysis of Chinese Policymaking - Wendy Leutert, Indiana University

• Legal Capacity, Ideational Change, and the Ramifications of Strategic Shift in China’s WTO Disputes - Jonathan J. Kinkel, Arizona State University

• Authoritarian Cooperation and Renminbi Reserve Currency Holdings - Susanne M. Redwood, Montana State University

• China and National-Security-Related Trade Restrictions in High-Tech Sectors - Sichen Li, Princeton University

Chair

• Christina Cottiero University of Utah

Discussant

• William Hurst University of Cambridge