The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: Enduring Challenges, New Methods

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel engages a series of enduring problems in nuclear politics, including extended deterrence, offensive and defensive weapons systems, and nonproliferation. Each of these research programs have long histories, but recent work shows that these traditional debates need new analysis to better understand and explain the modern nuclear era (e.g., Narang and Sagan 2023). This panel provides novel theoretical insights into such significant problems in nuclear politics in two major ways. First, the panel substantively engages the interaction of domestic politics and nuclear weapons—an interaction which has received less focus in nuclear politics until recently (Saunders 2019). For example, the papers by Allison and Arceneaux and Herzog and Sukin address public support for different weapons systems, while Ko and Lee also focus on public opinion to identify the effects of nuclear capabilities on reassurance in the state receiving extended deterrence promises. Haas, Mehta, and Troutman further explore the domestic politics of nuclear weapons by evaluating variation in neural activity between liberals and conservatives when confronted with material on nuclear reversal. Second, this panel uses modern methodological approaches to provide new insight into core debates in nuclear politics (Gartzke and Kroenig 2016, 2017). Several papers—including those by Allison and Arceneaux, Herzog and Sukin, and Ko and Lee—employ survey experiments to identify the effects of public opinion on nuclear outcomes. Lee contributes a distinct methodological angle by combining formal modeling and statistical analysis to explain the conditions under which foreign aid can deter nuclear proliferation. Haas, Mehta, and Troutman also use statistical methods to analyze a unique dataset of observations generated with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Combined, these papers advance our understanding of key debates in nuclear politics with new substantive and methodological approaches.

Sub Unit

• Division 19: International Security 

Individual Presentations

• Too Brutal For War: Normative Rationales for Weapons “Taboos” - Stephen Herzog, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey; Lauren Sukin, London School of Economics

• The Visibility of Extended Security Commitments and Reassurance Effects - Do Young Lee, University of Oslo; Jiyoung Ko, Korea University

• Ideology and Risk: The Neuroscience of Nuclear Reversal - Ingrid Haas, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Noelle Troutman, Arizona State University

• Beyond the Iron Dome: Cross-System Exposure and Missile Defense - Giles David Arceneaux, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs; David Allison, Yale University

• Deterrable or Committed Signalers? Economic Aid and Nuclear Nonproliferation - So Jin Lee, University of Pittsburgh

Chair

• J Andres Gannon Vanderbilt University

Discussant

• J Andres Gannon Vanderbilt University