(iPoster) Electoral Incentives and Capture of Accountability Institutions

• In Event: Poster Session: Human Rights & Issues in African Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Issues in African Politics

Abstract

Over the last decade, hundreds of lower-level executives have faced no-confidence votes or recall elections. The use of these institutional provisions to hold politicians accountable has implications for accountability, development, and democratic consolidation; however, the motives behind this surge of removals are unclear. I develop a theoretical argument wherein interactions between national and local politicians to achieve various goals create tensions that lead national politicians to shorten the incumbency of lower-level executives. I argue that lower-level executives face removal attempts when they do not comply with national politicians' directives -- regarding the endorsement of a candidate or a policy -- and removals yield a net positive payoff to the national politicians. Combining electoral records, local audit reports, and original interviews with mayors in Benin, I find that non-compliance with district leaders' declarations for support of presidential candidates induced a 67-percentage point increase in the likelihood of no-confidence votes on mayors after the elections. This paper provides the first theoretical and empirical characterization of how national politicians' electoral incentives lead to the premature removal of lower-level executives and the distortion of democratic accountability processes.

Author

• Lazare Kovo, Emory University