(iPoster) Deterrence, Strategic Culture, and Mathematics: A Dynamical Systems Approach

• In Event: Poster Session: Strategic Decision-Making in Global Security & International Relations Theory
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Strategic Decision-Making in Global Security

Abstract

It would be impossible to fully grasp a conflict without taking into consideration its causes and dynamics. Attempts at demystifying the players’ rationale behind their actions, perceptions, and connections will give rise to the importance of fully grasping their modus operandi. Scrutinizing the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s multidimensional conflict in the Middle East lays bare the importance of understanding the notion of deterrence/coercion, which is the key to deciphering the players’ perception of threat and regional security. Fortunately, the copious scholarship on the interaction between strategic culture and deterrence helps us properly assess the concepts governing various conflicts. For instance, the notion of a besieged fortress brought up by the Russian understanding of regional and global security, along with Russia’s definition of deterrence/coercion, can explain, albeit to some extent, its actions and desires in Ukraine. Likewise, we can trace inherent insecurity in the Israeli understanding of regional arrangements. Therefore, the idea of buffer zones will make a bridge between theory and practice in regional and international security. In the meantime, it is worthwhile to note that having a proper way to understand the dynamic nature of conflicts will help us make a deep yet informative connection between quantitative and qualitative analysis of deterrence and the repercussions of players’ strategic culture. Notwithstanding the long and fruitful history of applying mathematical methods in conflicts, including statistics, game theory, and dynamical systems, there is a paucity of scholarship on the strategic implications of players’ war efforts in tandem with the existing scholarship. In addition, based on the data we have, the concept of deterrence, at least through the lens of some players like Russia and Israel, differs from the Western one. As a result, acquiring a deep understanding of the dynamics of deterrence/ coercion in a given conflict is a must. In this paper, we use dynamical systems to introduce a novel model of conflicts, which embeds deterrence as a mathematical object whose features will shape the dynamics of conflicts and can lead to the emergence of complexities like limit cycle and chaos in our dynamical systems. Making a connection between qualitative and quantitative analysis through bifurcation theory, which deals with the role of parameters in a dynamical system, can offer viable solutions to the problems we face in international security. As case studies, we focus on the scholarship on deterrence and strategic culture and depict some scenarios of the repercussions of players’ deterrence strategies. Israel’s buffer zone in its periphery and Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine will be examined to determine the mathematical results of their deterrence attempts and their real-world interpretations.

Author

• Rouzbeh Aghaieebeiklavasani, University of Tehran