(iPoster) The Winning Strategies to Counter Populism – A fsQCA of 31 Parties in Europe

• In Event: Poster Session: Posters on European Politics, Advanced Industrial Societies, & Post-Soviet Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Posters on European Politics

Abstract

Why do some parties emerge as effective “gatekeepers” of liberal democracy against anti-system populism, while others falter? What strategies are effective in countering populism? Existing literature has largely focused on party strategies alone, such as excluding or socializing populist parties, overlooking the “causal complexity” wherein the effectiveness of party strategies to counter populism is closely shaped by their interactions with structural and institutional conditions. This paper deductively develops a theory of “optimal” gatekeeping that incorporates this causal complexity. I argue that, in response to the structural pressures of globalization and populist organization, the optimal gatekeeping for liberal democracy paradoxically requires gatekeeping parties to become populist themselves in states with weak intermediate institutions that formally mediate between society and states. This optimal gatekeeping entails two key strategies: a) Gatekeeping parties increase the salience of policies aligned with the new cultural cleavage. b) Gatekeeping parties face a strong imperative to act like populist parties organizationally to replace the traditional role of intermediate institutions in mobilizing voters. This theory is tested across 31 cases in Europe using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). While the findings provide empirical support for the theory of optimal gatekeeping in several cases, they also reveal an exciting alternative pathway: strong intermediate institutions, combined with low salience of cultural cleavages and a low level of populist organization, can effectively counter populism as well.

Author

• Yuxuan Gao, University of Oregon