(iPoster) When Violence Signals Weakness: Punishing Former Leaders in Authoritarian States

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes 1

Abstract

Previous studies have explored why some authoritarian leaders are punished after leaving office while others remain untouched, but little attention has been paid to the political ramifications of how new leaders treat their predecessors. We present a theory of power signaling, arguing that in opaque authoritarian regimes, the manner in which a leader handles their predecessor sends crucial signals about their own strength to potential challengers, influencing their willingness to rebel. Leaders who show restraint—by tolerating, exiling, or imprisoning their predecessors—are perceived as stronger and more confident, demonstrating the capacity to bear the governance costs of tolerating a potential rival. This conveys confidence in their grip on power and ability to manage threats without resorting to extreme measures.

Conversely, leaders who employ extreme violence, such as executing predecessors, inadvertently project an image of weakness. This suggests an inability to manage rivals without eliminating them, signaling vulnerability and potentially inviting further challenges. Rather than exhibiting toughness, excessive violence may reveal insecurities and a lack of confidence in their position.

To test this theory, we analyze data from 1945 to 2004 on the fates of authoritarian leaders and their subsequent performance. Using regression analyses, we examine the effects of different treatments of predecessors—including non-punishment, expulsion, imprisonment, and execution—on indicators of leader performance and political stability. Our findings indicate that imprisoning predecessors is associated with positive outcomes for the new leader's performance, whereas executing them leads to negative consequences. These results support our argument that the manner of punishment serves as a significant signal to potential challengers, affecting the stability and effectiveness of a leader's tenure. These findings suggest that rather than demonstrating toughness, extreme violence may expose a leader's vulnerabilities. This study enriches the literature on the role of signaling in authoritarian rule, the interplay between violence and political stability, and the political trajectories of authoritarian leaders.

Authors

• Junru Wu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

• Chuanzheng Zhang, Fudan University