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In the current era of democratic decline, politicians regularly undermine courts in competitive democracies. Prevailing rational-strategic theories of judicial independence fail to explain this pattern. I reconcile recent trends with political insurance theory by re-centering actor-level factors. I argue actors’ ideological views influence their rational-strategic evaluations of judicial independence. Specifically, when politician’s ideological goals and interests cause them to expect lower payoffs or perceive shorter time horizons, they are less inclined to support judicial independence. I explore this relationship along three dimensions of ideology – anti-systemness, populism, and left- right economic ideology – using data from 108 democracies and 1564 political parties from 1970 to 2015 (N=837). I find (a) anti-system views are negatively associated with judicial independence and both (b) populist views and (c) left-right economic views are not significantly associated with judicial independence. By centering actor-level characteristics, this analysis sheds light on how political ideology influences judicial independence.