(iPoster) Building Reputation: State-Sponsored Rebellions and Transnational Identities

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes 2

Abstract

We show that states strategically boost their reputation for resolve by backing rebellions in foreign countries. Our study provides broader insights into reputation-building in international relations, with a focus on co-ethnic links between countries as an objective source of variation in a state’s motivation to build its reputation. The theoretical mechanism yields two interconnected predictions: (a) a state is more likely to endorse the uprising of a foreign group when facing a larger audience, resulting in (b) greater political inclusion for the group. We build a comprehensive panel dataset of co-ethnic rebellion sponsorship and find empirical support for both predictions. This corroborates the role of reputation-building motivations and helps rule out alternative mechanisms, with significant policy implications for handling international conflicts and interventions. In particular, our theory sheds light on the complex relationships between Russia, other former USSR countries, and the Russian minorities they host.

Authors

• Benjamin Tremblay-Auger, Chapman

• Arthur Silve, Harvard University