(iPoster) Appease or Aggravate? Transparency-Complaints Link and NGOs’ Buffering Effect

• In Event: Poster Session: Judicial Politics & Public Administration
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Public Administration

Abstract

Transparency, widely regarded as an intrinsic value of democracy and a cornerstone of good governance, has been adopted by governments worldwide. Numerous studies have explored the effects of government transparency on citizens’ perceptions and behaviors, including their participation, compliance, policy support, trust in government, satisfaction with public service provision, and more. Yet little consensus has been achieved concerning the impact of transparency on citizens’ political engagement, especially in authoritarian contexts. While some studies argue that transparency stimulates civic engagement, enhances accountability and solidifies regime support, others suggest that it leads to disillusionment among citizens, revealing that increased transparency may demobilize the public (i.e., resignation) rather than enhance accountability (i.e., indignation) (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Moreover, some scholars have identified a mobilizing effect of transparency that destabilizes autocratic regimes through mass protest (Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2015).
The contentious relationship between transparency and citizens’ political engagement, particularly in authoritarian contexts, requires a more nuanced understanding that unpacks the complexities of transparency and empirically assesses the conditions under which transparency “works” (Cucciniello et al., 2017). Joining this line of research, this study sets itself in China, the world’s largest authoritarian regime, and examines the link between government transparency and public complaints, a prominent form of political engagement in non-democracies (Dimitrov, 2013; Nathan, 2003). Given the restrictive context—where citizens have been largely excluded from the representative system of institutional politics and prohibited from exploiting any non-institutional channel of interest articulation, such as protests—public complaints have become one of the most widely exploited channels of grievance expression and civic participation in China (J. Chen, 2016). This study therefore investigates: Does the provision of government information appease or aggravate public complaints? What factors influence the relationship between transparency and public complaints?
To answer the questions, we first establish the transparency-public complaints link—how government transparency appeases or aggravates public complaints—using the naming-blaming-claiming framework (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, 2007). Drawing from the literature on transparency and citizen activism, we then propose that the effect of transparency on public complaints is shaped by 1) the types of disclosed information, and 2) the engagement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We empirically investigate the transparency-public complaints link within the context of China’s environmental information disclosure. Building on Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, and Im (2013), we develop a novel index to measure the environmental transparency of Chinese local governments, based on their disclosure of four types of information: decision-making, policy content, policy outcomes, and regulatee information. By combing the novel index with datasets on public complaints and environmental NGOs (eNGOs), our statistical analysis reveals several noteworthy findings. First, while the disclosure of policy content and outcomes information tends to aggravate citizens’ complaints, the disclosure of decision-making and regulatee information does not produce the same effect. Second, eNGOs play a buffering role, mitigating the increase in public complaints caused by heightened disclosure of regulatee information. We draw on qualitative data to complement and substantiate our statistical results. Interviews with eNGO leaders and staff reveal three key mechanisms through which eNGOs alleviate the aggravating effects of transparency on public complaints.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in following ways. First, it advances transparency literature by assessing the conditions under which transparency “works” (Cucciniello et al., 2017). Specifically, we examine how different types of disclosed information and the engagement of NGOs influence the outcomes of transparency. Second, the study contributes to broader discussion on transparency without accountability/democracy. By focusing on China, the world’s largest authoritarian regime, we explore how transparency operates in contexts where democratic accountability mechanisms are absent, shedding light on the nuanced dynamics of government information disclosure and its societal implications. Third, by highlighting how public complaints, a prevalent form of political engagement in non-democracies, intersect with environmental transparency and civil society engagement, our research adds to the understanding of civic engagement in environmental politics under authoritarianism.

Authors

• CHENYANG HE, Fudan University

• Zi Zhu, China University of Political Science and Law