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Political scientists classically treat security alliances between states as static connections that facilitate interaction political and economic in nature. Arms trades, as a well-studied political economy phenomenon has garnered much attention as a political tool both for the exporter and importer. This study quantitatively studies the effect of bilateral alliances length on arms trade. The introduction of alliance length offers a novel dimension to alliances that is yet to be quantitatively studied. Focusing on the United States, the effect of bilateral security alliance length on imports and exports for 50 countries across 62 years of data is measured. Results show that alliances evolve over time, and political economy predictions of imbalances occurring between small and large states is observed – the U.S. exports more and imports less arms as alliance length increases. This study has implications for further study of dynamic alliances and introduces alliance length as a key variable.