(iPoster) Building Road, Buying Votes: The Political Impact of Infrastructure on Democracy

• In Event: Poster Session: Democracy and Autocracy I

Abstract

Grassroots democracy is widely regarded as a critical mechanism for improving social welfare, as it directly links collective decision-making with individual economic well-being. Village elections, a key manifestation of grassroots democracy, play a central role in determining the welfare of villagers. Many scholars argue that grassroots elections enhance the expression of public preferences and needs, leading to improvements in people's lives. However, critics point to widespread vote-buying and corruption in such elections, where elected leaders may fail to represent public interests and, in some cases, distort resource allocation to serve personal goals, ultimately harming public welfare.

One mechanism for addressing this issue is the public's ability to monitor and report corruption through formal grievance channels. Yet, the persistence and prevalence of corruption raise the question: why does corruption remain rampant despite the existence of oversight mechanisms? Clearly, the drivers of vote-buying and other forms of electoral corruption are more complex than initially assumed. One prominent explanation is the mutually beneficial relationship between local governments and candidates. Local governments may rely on candidates' social networks and resources to achieve governance objectives, while candidates leverage tacit approval from local governments to pursue economic gains and political ambitions. This dynamic is reflected in China's large-scale infrastructure projects.

The Chinese government’s push for infrastructure development often involves land requisition and relocation, sparking compensation disputes that threaten social stability. To ensure project progress, local governments may endorse vote-buying by wealthy candidates with strong resource mobilization. hese candidates, in turn, take advantage of compensation policies related to road construction and relocation, promising villagers additional benefits or compensation in exchange for electoral support. Once elected, they entrench corruption, perpetuating a cycle that hinders democratic development.

This paper examines how stability maintenance efforts and local governance objectives, within the context of road construction and land requisition, influence grassroots democratic development.

We conducted a randomized controlled trial with over 2,000 rural residents across China to study how road construction impacts vote-buying in village elections. Our surveys span northern, southern, central, eastern, and western China, including villages with and without road construction projects. Participants recall details of the last three elections to assess democratic continuity, and list experiments uncover true opinions on sensitive topics. Regional comparisons assessed the effects on vote-buying, welfare, and broader implications for village living standards. Rigorous measures ensured data accuracy, including IP verification, trap questions, and minimum response times.

We find that local governments, faced with resource distribution disputes and stability challenges, may tolerate or encourage vote-buying to ensure the election of village leaders capable of facilitating road construction. This significantly increases vote-buying, particularly favoring wealthy candidates. Text analysis reveals that local governments often use informal methods to support such candidates, aiding land requisition and compensation tasks.

For candidates, road construction offers control over compensation fund distribution, creating personal profit opportunities. Wealthy candidates with strong resource mobilization or coercive capabilities are favored by higher-level governments, making them more likely to engage in vote-buying to secure election success. This further increases vote-buying during elections near road construction projects.

We also analyze how road construction indirectly influences voter behavior. Compensation policies drive voters to support candidates who can expedite payments, a tendency especially pronounced for wealthy candidates. By controlling for variables, we rule out alternative explanations such as "wealthy candidates' greater social influence" or "relocation policies altering long-term voter attitudes." Anticipated road construction exacerbates unfair compensation distribution, harming villagers’ interests. Most villagers, focused on short-term benefits, see bribes as offsetting losses, further fueling vote-buying during these elections.

Our study reveals that large-scale infrastructure projects, while boosting regional economic growth, often undermine village governance by intensifying vote-buying and reducing electoral fairness. Vote-buying is not just an individual act but is often enabled by higher-level governments' tacit approval and villagers' limited democratic awareness.This research offers new insights into rural China's political ecology and underscore the importance of addressing the political implications of infrastructure projects in policy design.

Authors

• Jinman Leng, School of Information Management, Nanjing University

• Lorraine Bu, School of Finance, Renmin University of China