(iPoster) Bureaucracy by Judiciary: Impact of SCOTUS Decisions on Policy Implementation

• In Event: Poster Session: Judicial Politics & Public Administration
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Public Administration

Abstract

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided high profile cases related to agency discretion and congressional delegation to agency authority. In some instances, the Court has applied the “major questions doctrine” to argue that Congress must be specific in its delegation in highly salient situations. Most notably, in Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024), the Court overturned the long-standing Chevron doctrine, which allowed agencies to define the meaning of ambiguous language in legislation. The Court, in Loper, argued that it is the role of the judiciary to define ambiguous language and not the agencies as was allowed under Chevron. Further, the Court ruled that the SEC cannot seek civil penalties without a jury trial which may have far reaching implications on an agency’s ability to enforce congressionally authorized penalties. These decisions leave many unanswered questions as to how agencies will operate moving forward under this new institutional framework. In this paper, we will conduct a qualitative, descriptive case study to analyze the impact the Court’s new approach to agency discretion will have on policy implementation and execution by administrative agencies. Through this analysis we will illustrate how the judiciary’s new approach expands the role of the courts at agency, congressional and the public interest’s expense, creates uncertainties for agency authority moving forward; and solidifies an expanding and prominent role in policy implementation.

Authors

• Christopher Brough, University of Dayton

• Michelle C. Pautz, University of Dayton

• Li-Yin Liu, University of Dayton