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(iPoster) What Do We Protect? Bridging Militant Democracy and Polyarchy

Thu, September 11, 10:30 to 11:00am PDT (10:30 to 11:00am PDT), TBA

Abstract

How and when do democracies under threat survive? The global rise of far-right leaders and anti-democratic political parties, observed over the past decade, has not only drawn the attention of political science scholars but also underscored the critical importance of understanding and countering democratic erosion. This process highlights the inherent conflict between democracy and constitutionalism, particularly the potential for elections to become a mechanism for democratic erosion.
Democratic retrogression – a gradual erosion of essential democratic elements, including competitive elections, freedom of speech and association, and the rule of law – is a pressing concern. In this context, it is urgent to comprehend and explain the strategies used by democratic countries to combat internal non-violent threats. Given the emergence of authoritarian political movements and parties in Brazil, a case that holds significant implications for the global understanding of democratic erosion, the role of institutional actors in defending democracy becomes paramount. This role includes the Judiciary and the Congress, whose effective responses to these challenges are crucial.
This paper takes a unique approach by addressing how and when democratic actors respond to non-violent threats from parties and leaders who, while playing the democratic game, use ambiguous discourse and legal means to undermine democracy. The study focuses on the strategies and measures institutional actors adopt in response to anti-democratic movements and leaders in Brazil, providing a complete understanding of the Brazilian context. Although the debate is in its infancy in the country, the banning of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) in 1947 suggests the adoption of militant democracy at the beginning of its democratization process.
Although widely adopted in the literature, militant democracy lacks a clear theoretical consensus, both on the democratic components that deserve special protection and on who is legitimized to apply such measures. This gap directly impacts understanding of how political elites restrict or exclude a political opponent, especially in assessing the strategic calculations and legitimacy of institutional responses.
This paper seeks to answer three central questions: What do we understand as democracy? Which democratic rules should be protected? How can democracies protect themselves from non-violent, anti-democratic leaders? To do this, I revisit Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which presents democracy as a regime of continuous government responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens, the result of strategic calculations of costs and benefits made by political actors who are in constant conflict, and Lowenstein’s militant democracy. I argue that the latter should not be understood as an idealistic but pragmatic instrument for preserving polyarchy, subject to political actors’ calculus.

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