(iPoster) Personhood Rights: Legal and Moral

• In Event: Poster Session: Foundations of Political Theory 1 (Normative)

Abstract

Human rights, by definition, belong to all human beings. In practise, however, we see rights afforded to some human beings, and not to others. Hannah Arendt’s concept “the right to have rights” is posited in response to this dilemma, and it is oft referred to by political theorists conceptualising human rights. Arendt’s concept is dominantly understood as the right of citizens, or at least of those with legal membership in a state. The primary human right, on this interpretation, is the right of citizenship. Secondarily, by virtue of one’s legal membership in the state, one gains the promise of civic rights, attached to that membership.

This interpretation does not, however, account for citizens (i.e. those who have legal entitlement to civic rights protections) whose rights are nonetheless disrespected or rejected. As an example, a young Black man in America may be a citizen of the United States; yet, as we have witnessed far too often, this is no guarantee that his very right to life will be respected, let alone his other civic rights. Being a human being, even one with legal status, is not enough, to demonstrate one’s humanity – that prerequisite for human rights.

In this paper, I propose a conceptual replacement of ‘human rights’ with personhood rights. Within this theoretical framework, only those who are recognised as persons are eligible for rights. Personhood takes two forms: legal and moral. I argue it is only when one receives recognition of both their legal and moral personhood that they can be meaningfully said to have the right to have rights.

I contend that, within our contemporary human rights institutions, the state is responsible for granting legal personhood. The state, by granting citizenship to the young Black man, recognises him as a legal person. Attached to this legal personhood is a specific set of rights, promised by the state in question. Legal personhood is thus a prerequisite to the right to have rights; yet, it is not enough, on its own, to guarantee civic rights protections.

Moral personhood, on the other hand, is bestowed by others in one's community. To be granted moral personhood is to receive recognition of one’s entitlement to rights. This is ultimately the recognition of another as an equal human being; in other words, recognition of one’s moral personhood establishes recognition of one’s shared humanity. Such moral status is neither guaranteed nor static: certain groups of human beings may receive such recognition at one point, and not at another. The treatment of Black populations, of Indigenous populations, and of differently abled populations are just a few illustrations of this; historically, members of these groups were not always granted recognition as equal human beings, entitled to rights. While some may be acknowledged as belonging to the same human species, they may not be recognised as possessing that characteristic necessary for rights entitlement. In other words, their moral personhood may be denied.

Ultimately, I argue in this paper that being recognised as both a legal and moral person makes it possible to act as a human being in the world. As such, recognition of one’s legal and moral personhood is a prerequisite for the exercise of one’s right to have rights. 

Author

• Laila Khoshkar, University of Toronto