(iPoster) Media Bias, Public Policy and Conflict Deescalation in Insurgencies

• In Event: Poster Session: Security and the Politics of Military Cooperation

Abstract

We analyze a model of conflict between an insurgency and a government. The median voter chooses an equilibrium tax rate and the government chooses how much tax revenue to allocate to the provision of a public good. The remainder is used to provide security against insurgent attacks. There is a single media outlet that is assumed to report on the value of the public good. In this context, we determine how the location of the attack and its probability changes when the media outlet is captured by the elites vis-a-vis when it is independent. Further, we analyze the likelihood of capture when inequality changes and investigate how that affects both the location of attack and its probability. Finally, we show whether or not the government can find a mechanism (information structure) that mitigates the scope of the conflict through Bayesian Persuasion and investigate its effect on the location of an attack.

Author

• Abhra Roy, Kennesaw State University