(iPoster) Bombing and Bonding? The Muted Legacy of Strategic Bombing in Japan, 1942–1952

• In Event: Poster Session: Elections, Campaigns and Voting Behavior & International Perspectives on Networks and Political Engagement
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Elections, Campaigns and Voting Behavior

Abstract

Why do certain harrowing collective experiences—such as mass bombings—sometimes fail to leave an enduring political legacy? Conventional wisdom holds that extreme violence imprints itself on communities, shaping their political preferences for generations. Although many studies support this notion, some cases defy it—instances that may be underreported due to publication bias. Post–World War II Japan offers a striking example: despite devastating bombings of numerous cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, localities often favored pro-American or non-pacifist parties in subsequent elections.

To investigate this paradox, I constructed a dataset at the 1952 municipal level using Ministry of Defense archives. It catalogs bombing sites, pre-war military installations (army/navy bases and factories), and the shortest flight paths from US air bases in Saipan and Iwo Jima. Because bomber crews often had leftover bombs or needed to lighten their load after striking a primary target, they dropped ordnance on “secondary targets” en route to or from the main site. This practice produced a quasi-random pattern of destruction, allowing me to exploit largely exogenous routes—determined by operational feasibility rather than local politics—as an instrumental variable (IV) for bombing damage. I also calculated municipal-level average altitude and variance—high-altitude bombing favored flatter terrain—and interacted these measures with the IV to strengthen the first stage.

Controlling for pre-war military presence and other confounders, I examined voting in the 1952 election, when purged wartime politicians were permitted to run again. Contrary to expectations, bombed areas tended to back these rehabilitated figures and pro-American, center-right parties, rather than socialist or pacifist candidates. Nationalist parties saw no significant effect. Analysis of the 1942 election revealed no preexisting political bias in areas later affected.

Why did bombed localities not develop anti-US or pacifist leanings? The findings highlight a complex interplay of military demography, POW experiences, and Cold War geopolitics:

1. Regiment Survival and Local Influence
By introducing an interaction term between bombing intensity and the casualty rate of local infantry regiments, I find that places where many soldiers returned despite heavy bombing voted for pro-US, center-right parties. Soldiers’ comparatively positive experiences with American forces may have influenced local opinion.

2. Differential POW Treatment
Areas with large numbers of Soviet returnees show higher overall support for right-wing parties, likely because veterans captured by the Soviets endured harsher conditions than those held by Americans. Learning of these stark differences reinforced pro-American attitudes among the soldiers and pre-war elites, particularly as tensions with the USSR escalated.

3. Institutional Mediation of Memory
Bombed cities required extensive reconstruction, and returning soldiers often led these efforts. While war memorials and commemorations did emerge, the framing of bombing experiences favored conservative or pro-US politics rather than sparking pacifist movements.

Japan’s case illustrates that severe trauma does not automatically produce enduring anti-war politics. Instead, institutional contexts and local elites can reshape war memories to align with certain agendas—what might be considered a “strategic reframing.” Hence, Hiroshima and Nagasaki—despite their profound suffering—repeatedly supported pro-American, non-pacifist parties.

In a broader context, the massacres in Nanjing and Manila were both significant, though the latter seemingly lacked long-lasting political legacies under Cold War pressures. Meanwhile, German cities such as Dresden and Hamburg show different political trajectories after their own devastating bombings. These parallels suggest a wider dynamic in how war trauma is mediated by local institutional conditions and international alignments.

Ultimately, this study underscores that collective suffering alone does not dictate political outcomes; rather, who wields influence in reconstruction—whether returning soldiers, political elites, or external allies—plays a critical role in shaping their political legacy.

Author

• Makoto Fukumoto, Waseda University