(iPoster) Backsliding Halted, Democracy Recovered? The Case of Post-Erosion Brazil

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries & South Asian Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries

Abstract

History has shown that democratic backsliding can be halted and that preventing a country from sliding into authoritarianism is possible. In the United States, Joe Biden’s election in 2020 marked an end to the gradual decline in democratic quality under the Trump administration. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory in 2022 interrupted the democratic erosion under Jair Bolsonaro, while in Poland, a democratic coalition succeeded in replacing the PiS government in 2023. This paper argues, however, that halting democratic erosion is not the same as achieving democratic recovery. The mechanisms that stop backsliding—whether resilient institutions, effective resistance strategies, or other factors—represent a distinct challenge from the processes that facilitate recovery after the erosion’s halt.

Much of the literature lacks clarity in distinguishing between the phases of democratic erosion, its conclusion, and the subsequent post-erosion period. In some cases, these different phases are blurred either by framing recovery as part of the backsliding process (Riedl et al., 2024) or by inherently interpreting the end of erosion as the survival of democracy (Laebens & Lührmann 2021). This is particularly evident in the assessment of the Brazilian case, which scholars characterize as a “quick recovery,” where democracy not only survived but also “returned to business as usual” (Melo & Pereira 2024).

We propose a conceptual distinction between democratic erosion, its conclusion, and the post-erosion period, arguing that this differentiation enables more precise empirical classifications. Using the Brazilian case as an example, we demonstrate that resistance—particularly from key institutions such as the Supreme Court, Congress, and broader society—played a critical role. As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2024) and Levitsky (2024) note, Brazil outperformed the United States regarding institutional resistance and social mobilization against authoritarian threats. However, it would be overly simplistic to assume that successful resistance to democratic backsliding automatically translates into successful democratic recovery.

In our analysis, we investigate the interplay between actors and institutions both during the erosion and in the subsequent post-erosion phase, highlighting the complexities of this transitional period. To provide a broader perspective, we also offer comparative insights into the factors influencing recovery trajectories. For illustration, we use the cases of the United States and Ecuador. We use V-Dem data across time to demonstrate that countries follow different paths and timelines for democratic recovery. In Brazil, for example, despite the notable success of institutions in holding former President Bolsonaro accountable for attacks on democracy—contrary to the U.S. experience, as Steven Levitsky noted in an interview at the Cardoso Foundation—the country had not, by 2023 (the most recent V-Dem data available), regained its pre-erosion democratic levels. Furthermore, Brazil does not appear to be "operating as business as usual," as some institutions have failed to fully recalibrate following the halt in erosion, and a complete replacement of authoritarian actors has not yet occurred. Our analysis shows that Brazil's post-erosion episode does not account for an automatic democratic recovery and requires a more nuanced evaluation. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between resistance and recovery, as the latter requires addressing lingering institutional and political legacies of the erosion process.
The paper's contribution is both conceptual and empirical. By distinguishing between erosion and post-erosion dynamics, we advance the ongoing debate, offering insights into the factors contributing to successful resistance against authoritarian threats and those facilitating democratic recovery—two processes that are not necessarily identical. Empirically, our paper illustrates the varying dynamics and mechanisms observed in the Brazilian case, particularly the role of institutional resilience, societal mobilization, and the interplay between key actors and institutions during and after erosion. The takeaway for the policy dimension is that the proposed distinction enables more precise and tailored recommendations for each distinct context.

Authors

• Marianne R. Kneuer, TU Dresden

• Gessica de Freitas, University of Notre Dame