(iPoster) Committing to Peace: The Politics of Post-War Conflict Management in Colombia

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes 1

Abstract

This article analyzes when, how, and why peace sticks for non-state armed groups. To do so, I address two interrelated questions. First, why do some members of an armed organization decide to withdraw from an ongoing peace negotiation with the state and keep fighting? Second, why do some ex-combatants who signed the peace agreement return to war in the post-conflict while others remain committed to peace? I answer these questions by studying the divergent trajectories of splinter groups during and after the peace process between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian state in 2016. Using within-case analysis and process tracing, I show how the cohesion of warring parties during the negotiation and implementation phases of peace agreements is crucial for explaining whether armed actors 1) keep fighting, 2) successfully demobilize, or 3) return to war in the post-conflict.
I identify two different origins for FARC splinter groups in post-accord Colombia. First, the Estado Mayor Central group (EMC) was created by hardliner leaders who broke away from the more moderate FARC negotiating team in Havana before the agreement was concluded. These leaders were active in territories more closely connected with illicit economies and drug trafficking and had a strong criminal incentive to remain at war. Second, the Segunda Marquetalia group (SM) emerged in response to the failed attempt of the Office of the Attorney General to arrest Jesus Santrich, an influential FARC commander, on drug trafficking charges. Such a move represented a violation of the terms of the agreement and triggered the remobilization of some FARC commanders, who saw it as treason from the state. While the executive pushed the peace agenda, the legislative was slow to authorize funds for implementing provisions, and judicial institutions were embattled over who had jurisdiction over the FARC peace signatories. This lack of coordination among branches of government led to state fragmentation and slow peace implementation on the state side, providing incentives for ex-combatants to return to war in the post-conflict.
Thus, this research contributes to understanding the conditions under which two or more parties that agree to make peace can effectively deliver it. I find that (1) the very process of drafting a peace agreement and (2) the initial moves shortly after signing a peace agreement are decisive for the success of peacebuilding efforts. These two stages are critical moments in the peace-making process. Peace may not stick because of moves during these two phases. In contrast to rival explanations for peace breakdowns that emphasize primarily economic considerations and profit, I highlight the political and social forces that shape the cohesion of negotiating parties and their ability to follow up on their commitments to peace effectively. I develop a sequential theory of successful peacebuilding and argue that peacebuilding involves different challenges at different stages of the process.
The first challenge is to ensure that negotiating parties remain cohesive at all times. If negotiating parties are fragmented, some breakaway factions like the EMC might return to war even before an agreement is concluded. The second challenge is overcoming the commitment problem during the implementation phase. Building trust among negotiating parties is crucial: issues of assurance and signaling are key because the parties do not yet trust each other. Breaches of the agreement and non-implementation of the stipulations, like direct attacks on ex-combatants and judicial persecution of their leaders, can decrease their trust in the government and the peace process, and provide incentives for them to return to war in the post-conflict.
To assess the merit of each hypothesis (the economic versus the socio-political), I build a FARC fronts dataset (N≈70). The fronts were the FARC’s leading military and tactical subdivision during wartime, responsible for carrying out military operations and controlling territories. Out of a universe of roughly seventy fronts, I have identified forty-one active units in the post-conflict. Twenty-six units splintered before the agreement, while fifteen remobilized after the agreement. For each front, I collect information on their status (demobilized, remobilized, or remained at war), their leadership and their justifications for returning to or staying in war, whether they participate in illegal economies or not, the type of activities they are devoted to, and their region of operation. By working inductively and deductively, my two-stage argument about coalition maintenance and commitment, signaling, and trust building can travel to other contexts where non-state armed actors sign peace agreements with the government, and peace must be implemented. It has predictive value because it expects to find that fragmented actors produce negative peacebuilding outcomes.

Author

• Sebastian Tobon Palma, University of Illinois at Chicago