(iPoster) Why Issue a Threat? Understanding Vote-Buying in Rivalries

• In Event: Poster Session: Issues in the Political Theory of Economic Equality and Democracy & Political Methodology
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Political Methodology

Abstract

Existing coercion models in international relations literature generally focus on a single “sender” compelling or persuading a target, overlooking the critical role of a second sender whose interests conflict with the first. This research introduces formal models with two senders competing for a target’s vote, demonstrating how multiple-sender dynamics can fundamentally reshape the logic of threatening. Contrary to the conventional view—which posits that threats arise only when they can change the position of the target—we identify two surprising outcomes. First, a sender may preemptively issue a threat even if the target is already inclined to support it. Second, a sender might issue a threat that it expects to fail in order to induce the other sender to issue a threat that undermines a potential alliance between the second sender and the target. Through both complete- and incomplete-information game-theoretic analyses, we show that threats can emerge primarily from rivalry considerations rather than from an expectation of compliance.

Author

• Taniazaman Sarna, Arizona State University