(iPoster) Transitive Deterrence: Casting the Long Shadow of Nuclear Umbrella

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

This article develops the novel theory of transitive nuclear deterrence. When a nuclear patron’s leaders strongly desire to deter attacks on an unprotected non-nuclear state, but publicly committing to the latter's defense entails high domestic costs, the patron will instead induce an established ally – via side payments – to commit to defend the designated state. Anticipating the patron’s latent "chain-ganging," a prospective attacker perceives a higher nuclear escalatory risk from military revisionism. We formalize this logic in a one-shot extensive-form game with one-sided incomplete information and evaluate its implications through a mixed-methods approach. A natural experiment of Soviet-China-North Korea relations (1954-1961), large-N analyses of alliance media exposure, and alliance provisions data from 1945 onward provide corroborating evidence. The findings show that higher domestic accountability costs for patrons correlate with a greater likelihood of using transitive commitments, which, while being less effective than public commitments, are still potent deterrents.

Authors

• Deye Kevin Li, University of Notre Dame

• Unregistered Participant