(iPoster) Selective Deference under Threat: Public Threat Perceptions and Democratic Oversight in Taiwan

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Participation and Representation & Democracy and Autocracy II
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Democracy and Autocracy II

Abstract

When citizens face credible external security threats, do they simply trade away democratic accountability? This paper argues the answer is dimensional rather than categorical. Citizens distinguish between two separable objects of democratic information governance: public disclosure (what the general public and media can access) and authorized oversight (what legally empowered institutions can monitor). Under threat, these two dimensions need not move together. Using a preregistered 2×2 survey experiment in Taiwan, I vary threat salience and the government's informational posture. The results reveal a clear asymmetry: both high threat and secrecy-expanding policy responses substantially increase acceptance of limiting public disclosure, but support for authorized oversight remains resistant to erosion. Under high threat, the negative effect of a secrecy-expanding policy on oversight support disappears entirely. This is consistent with a compensatory demand for authorized oversight as public disclosure becomes more restricted. The pattern suggests that security pressure produces selective rather than generalized deference, with citizens showing greater tolerance for limits on public visibility than for erosion of authorized oversight.

Authors

• Yuru Fu, National Taiwan University

• Yuan Yuan Hsu, University of Southern Califonia