(iPoster) Economic Booms and Institutional Change Pathways to Backsliding in Latin America

• In Event: Poster Session: Democracy and Autocracy I

Abstract

Why do some institutional changes spearheaded by presidents lead to democratic backsliding while others do not? Although prior research has emphasized presidents’ prerogatives to alter institutions and their effects on political systems, recent scholarship suggests that some democratically elected presidents consolidate power without formally dismantling democratic institutions. However, it remains unclear why, how, and under what conditions presidents target specific institutions and when such changes provoke episodes of democratic backsliding. I argue that economic booms and the type of reform increase the likelihood of democratic backsliding. Economic booms boost approval among citizens, elites, and international actors, creating favorable conditions for presidents to pursue institutional change. Some reforms strengthen democracy, while others—though framed as democratic—consolidate power by weakening checks and balances, ultimately undermining democracy. I address these issues by compiling an original dataset on presidential institutional changes—examining constitutions, electoral rules, and judicial reform—and estimating panel regression models and matching methods for 18 Latin American countries since the start of the Third Wave of Democracy. The results show that, all else equal, positive economic shocks combined with certain presidential institutional changes increase the likelihood of backsliding episodes. These findings challenge the view that presidents reform institutions primarily during economic downturns and show that economic booms, together with the type of reform, shape whether presidents strengthen or undermine democracy.

Author

• Gustavo Pérez-Arrobo, University of Colorado Boulder