(iPoster) Competing to Coordinate: De Facto Authority and China's Clean Tech Leadership

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Frontiers in International Political Economy & Advanced Industrial Societies
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Frontiers in International Political Economy

Abstract

China's clean tech success is not primarily a story of state capacity. Wind received earlier and more sustained central support than solar, yet solar moved rapidly toward the world technology frontier while wind remained dependent on foreign designs. This divergence cannot be explained by variation in policy intensity. It reflects whether coordination rested on de jure designation or de facto authority.
A private developmental coordinator is a politically embedded actor that performs the entrepreneurial function at the industry level. Rather than innovating mainly within the firm, it solves collective action bottlenecks by building standards, coordinating supply chains, and organizing compliance in ways compatible with state boundary management. Crucially, these coordinators operate through tolerance rather than protection, and exposure rather than shelter. Their survival is not guaranteed by the state. They remain disciplined by market competition and international pressure, and this exposure is precisely what makes their coordination credible.
In solar, delayed central intervention allowed leading firms to accumulate technological authority and coordination capacity under competitive pressure, becoming de facto coordinators before the state arrived. When the center later moved to consolidate the sector, it found capable private partners with whom to institutionalize technology roadmaps, credit screening criteria, and efficiency standards. In wind, early state involvement designated de jure coordinators whose authority derived from political standing rather than demonstrated technical and market competence. This left the center without allies whose credibility could anchor industry-wide upgrading.
The paper draws on sector policy documents, firm-level production and performance data, and fieldwork-based process tracing of pivotal episodes in both industries. Against statist accounts, it shows that earlier and stronger intervention produced weaker outcomes by creating coordinators whose authority rested on designation rather than performance. Against market liberal frameworks, it demonstrates that private coordination in China operates through state channels rather than around them. Market under command works only when de facto coordinators, forged through exposure, help build the market that the state commands.

Author

• Binyi Yang, Nanyang Technological University