(iPoster) Vocal Extremism and Elite Polarization

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Formal Theory

Abstract

Does the tendency for extremists to be more vocal drive elite polarization? We investigate this question using a Calvert-Wittman model with a Berk-Nash equilibrium (BNE) in which candidates have incorrect beliefs about which voters announce their preferences publicly. We derive three key results. First, vocal extremism has no affect on candidate polarization when candidates have an accurate model of citizen participation in a conventional Nash equilibrium. Second, in a BNE we demonstrate that if candidates' misspecified model has them underweight the level of vocal extremism, vocal extremism exacerbates elite polarization. Finally, we demonstrate that if extreme platforms decrease moderate citizen participation and moderate non-participation induces candidate beliefs of mass polarization, vocal extremism results in a positioning trap. I examine empirical evidence for the model using observational evidence, finding support for the theory.

Author

• Liam Bethlendy, Stanford University