(iPoster) Asymmetric Zero-Sum Beliefs and Foreign Policy Attitudes in China

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  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Political Cognition, Crisis, and Conflict Attitudes

Abstract

Citizens and foreign policy elites in the United States and China seem increasingly convinced that the two countries are major competitors, if not existential foes. These perceptions appear rooted in a growing belief that bilateral relations are “zero-sum,” wherein one country’s gains come at the other’s expense, and one must “lose” for the other to “win” (Weiss 2022). The potential consequences of such thinking for U.S.-China relations, and world affairs more generally, are severe, ranging from missed opportunities for cooperation and exchange, to open hostility and even violent conflict. Despite the alarming significance of these trends, there exists to date no systematic analysis of the nature, causes, or, by extension, possible ameliorators of zero-sum thinking in the U.S.-China “rivalry.” This paper begins to address that gap through a survey experiment conducted online in China (N=2,500). Drawing on recent work on zero-sum thinking in social psychology, the paper tests the hypothesis that Chinese citizens harbor “asymmetric zero-sum beliefs” about U.S.-China relations across various domains—that is, they view one country’s gains as more zero-sum than the other’s (Roberts & Davidai 2022). The analysis examines whether asymmetric zero-sum beliefs wax under conditions of perceived comparative disadvantage and wane under conditions of perceived comparative advantage. It tests whether comparative disadvantage and ensuing zero-sum thinking lead Chinese citizens to attribute greater relative blame to the United States for disagreements and tensions in the relationship, and greater credit to China for bilateral cooperation. Finally, it studies the effects of these perceptions and beliefs on foreign policy attitudes, including support for policies that limit U.S. influence and expand China’s influence, and policies that reciprocate or initiate cooperation and reassurance vis-à-vis the United States. Heterogenous effects are investigated as well, particularly by interrogating nationalism as a possible moderator. In addition to providing a more complete microfoundational picture of the causes and consequences of zero-sum thinking in U.S.-China relations, the paper also proffers a new theoretical perspective on the international relations concept of the “security dilemma” (Butterfield 1950; 1951; Herz 1950; 1951; Jervis 1976; 1978; Glaser 1997; 2024; Booth & Wheeler 2008; Tang 2009; Schweller 2010; Kertzer, Brutger, & Quek 2024, Bell & Quek 2025), reconceptualizing security dilemma thinking as a species of the broader psychological category of asymmetric zero-sum beliefs.

Author

• Brian O'Keefe, Cornell University