(iPoster) The Logic of Parallel Armies

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Formal Theory

Abstract

All polities require armed forces to protect themselves against external threats. In authoritarian regimes, this generates an internal threat for rulers since these militaries possess both the capability and incentive to launch a coup. Existing scholarship points towards the creation of a loyal (but incompetent) army as a potential solution to this guardianship dilemma. Developing a formal model, I demonstrate that loyalty is not necessary provided the ruler may create multiple armies to counterbalance each other. This parallel army structure is most likely when rulers have relatively high resource budgets but low personal strength. Contrary to existing theory, this counterbalancing increases the overall strength of the autocrat's armed forces while simultaneously increasing the probability of a coup. I show how the model's findings help explain the usage of parallel armies in both historical empires and contemporary autocracies.

Author

• Josiah Rath, University of Rochester