(iPoster) Arming, Alliance, and Screening: Do Alliances Deter Preventive War?

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Abstract

I develop a formal model in which arms buildup creates an incentive for preventive war due to the fear of hidden revisionism. I then examine how alliances alter these dynamics. The model reveals a screening effect: alliances make arms buildup more informative by changing its value and purpose, and this screens the otherwise hidden intention of a protégé. This mechanism solves a different information problem from existing theories, and fully committed alliances can simultaneously restrain a protégé and deter an aggressor. Two historical cases, the German response during the July Crisis and Japanese military politics after World War II, illustrate the model's usefulness. A large-N analysis further supports the theory, showing that alliances decrease the likelihood of preventive war.

Author

• Yuji Masumura, Kobe University