(iPoster) Formal Rules, Informal Power: Inequality in Intergovernmental Organizations

• In Event: Poster Session: International Collaboration Section

Abstract

How does power distribution among members of intergovernmental organizations differ and what explain such differences? For instance, out of a sample of twelve intergovernmental organizations that have “bank” in their name, only Nordic Investment Bank adopts a unanimous voting rule where each state has one vote and an organization requires a unilateral agreement to adopt a policy while eleven of them adopt weighted voting rules that allow some states to have more voting power than others, often driven by factors such as imbalanced financial contribution to the organization. Using original data created by studying existing treaties, agreements, the Yearbook of International Organizations, and other data sources, we examine intergovernmental organizations’ de facto and de jure power distribution. We explore the concordance between de facto and de jure power distribution, and the factors that are more likely to lead to one than the other. We find that regional organization are more likely to have de facto unequal distribution of power, but less likely to have formal views contributing to this unequal distribution. Additionally, intergovernmental organizations with powerful states among their founding members are more likely to have de jure rules that distribute power unequally due to path dependence.

Authors

• Unregistered Participant

• Bree Laura Bang-Jensen, University of Georgia