(iPoster) Beyond Violence: Competing Migration Management and Social Control in Civil War

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Health Politics and Policy & Wartime Violence, Armed Actors, and Civilian Agency
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Wartime Violence, Armed Actors, and Civilian Agency

Abstract

Civilian migration during civil war is a central yet understudied force shaping conflict dynamics. Civilians in frontline areas provide recruits, resources, and legitimacy to armed groups, while displacement and internal migration can transmit instability to previously peaceful backline regions. Governments therefore face a tradeoff between weakening rebels in contested areas and preventing conflict spillover, while rebels must balance conscription and governance to keep civilians from leaving. Existing research emphasizes violence as a tool for regulating civilian movement, yet nonviolent tools such as wartime governance, displacement aid, and protection remain understudied. This paper develops a formal model of a government, a rebel group, and a continuum of civilians to analyze when wartime actors provide aid and governance to manage migration flows. The equilibrium shows that when civilians’ cost of war is high, governments and rebels may collude in migration control by increasing aid on the frontline. Moreover, when the backline is highly unstable, governments may strategically provide aid even to rebel supporters to limit conflict contagion, despite strengthening their opponent. I test these predictions using panel data from the International Organization for Migration’s Camp Assessment Surveys (Rounds 24–32) during the Tigray War in Ethiopia (2020–2023), finding evidence consistent with the model’s core implications.

Author

• Zhejun Qiu, University of Pittsburgh