(iPoster) Public Ultimatums vs. Veiled Pressure: Politics of Demand Signaling in Sanctions

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Abstract

Why do states sometimes make explicit demands when employing economic coercive measures, while at other times they obscure them? Conventional wisdom suggests that coercers be upfront and explicit about what they want in order to ensure the targets understand and comply with their demands, yet empirical cases show considerable variation in how demands are communicated. This paper seeks to explore the conditions under which states adopt either overt or covert signaling strategies. I develop a theory of coercive demand signaling, which posits that the decision to publicize or conceal true political demands in sanctions reflects the coercers’ careful calibration of self-image and other actors’ perceptions. The legitimacy of demands is the key factor shaping which international image the coercers want to project. Specifically, when the coercive demands are consistent with international laws and norms regulating international trading practices, states can be open about what they want. In such cases, publicity fortifies their image as credible and law-abiding actors. Legitimacy mounts greater pressure on the targets and facilitates concessions. In contrast, when demands stem from contested and self-serving interests, such as territorial disputes, historical redress, or interference in a state’s autonomy, coercers send covert signals to avoid reputational damage and facilitate more flexible settlement of disputes. Since total acquiescence to politically salient and contested demands would be too costly, if not fatal, for the target, ambiguity allows for pressure, preserves plausible deniability, and opens the door to negotiated resolution. Covert signaling is particularly preferable when the target is a strategically and economically important partner, as an open face-off can jeopardize the bilateral relations. I test this argument using a dataset adapted from the Global Sanctions Database that tracks sanction episodes from 1950 to 2023, and conducting comparative case studies of Russia’s economic coercion of Ukraine (2012-2014) and Japan’s export restrictions on South Korea (2019-2023). The findings offer fresh insights into political signaling and economic sanctions.

Author

• Thang Ha, Boston University