(iPoster) Diplomatic Signaling and Perception-Driven Escalation in China–U.S. Relations

• In Event: Poster Sessions: International Security II & Normative Political Theory
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Security II

Abstract

Rationalist and political-psychological approaches adopt different assumptions about information when explaining the origins of war. Rationalist theories emphasize that states may deliberately conceal or misrepresent private information—such as resolve, capabilities, or willingness to fight—thereby increasing the risk of conflict even among rational actors. In contrast, political-psychological perspectives argue that war may result from misperceptions of an adversary’s private information, even when such information is neither concealed nor strategically distorted, due to cognitive biases or motivated reasoning. Through a comparative analysis of two historical cases, this paper identifies a distinctive empirical puzzle in the escalation dynamics of China–U.S. relations. The Korean War demonstrates a case in which China made sustained efforts to signal its private information to the United States, yet these signals failed to prevent escalation. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Strait crisis illustrates a similar logic, in which the United States underestimated China’s resolve and sensitivity regarding the Taiwan issue, contributing to heightened tensions. Based on these comparative case studies, the paper advances a theoretical argument that underestimation—rather than concealment—of private information constitutes a critical mechanism driving conflict outbreak and escalation in China–U.S. relations. This framework integrates rationalist signaling theory with political-psychological insights, offering a more comprehensive explanation of escalation dynamics between major powers.

Author

• Jiwu Yin, Renmin University of China