(iPoster) Anti-Elitist Representation and the Imperative Mandate

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Foundations of Political Theory II & Autocratic Politics and Democracy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Foundations of Political Theory II

Abstract

Amid overwhelming narratives of democratic decline, scholars have highlighted the deficiencies of representative government and advocated greater citizen participation as a means of bolstering democracy. This line of inquiry has revived broader debates about what a democracy can expect of its citizens. In this paper, I argue that the imperative mandate entails a conception of political subjectivity that is more compelling than the one found in representative democracy organized around free mandates. Its main contribution is to demonstrate that the crisis of representative democracy need not lead to a rejection of representation tout court—only of the free mandate. Hence, it proposes the imperative mandate as a distinct alternative to both the free mandate and direct democracy.
Whereas proponents of new modes of direct participation appeal to a notion of political subjectivity that assumes citizens are deeply involved in politics, empirical and theoretical scholars alike have been quick to dismiss this notion. According to an eclectic group of scholars—including Kevin Elliot, Jason Brennan, Dimitri Landa, Ryan Pevnick, Christopher Achen, and Larry Bartels—direct democracy is a pipedream that overlooks the fact that citizens lack the prerequisite knowledge for genuine political participation and are too busy with other things.
While this verdict might be empirically sound, it gives rise to a notion of political subjectivity that should be rejected. Underlying the seemingly innocent conclusion that citizens are too busy or lack knowledge is a fundamentally elitist depiction of democracy that perpetuates the sentiments of the founders of modern representative governments. Since the dawn of modern constitutions in the late 18th century, representative government has been organized around free mandates, whereby representatives, upon election, become independent of their constituents.
This institutional design is inseparable from the aristocratic conviction that only the select few are fit for governing. In fact, the paper posits that institutions and political subjectivity are mutually reinforcing: so long as the free mandate remains in place, citizens will continue to adapt to its elitist sentiments—and vice versa. Moreover, construing citizens as disinterested and incompetent is deeply at odds with the democratic commitment to autonomy, which entails that individuals should only be subjected to laws they give themselves. If the commitment to autonomy is to be maintained, we must break with democratic institutions that rely on independent representatives and disengaged citizens.
The deficiencies of this notion of political subjectivity need not imply a rejection of representation in favor of direct democracy. Instead, the paper reorients the debate by drawing attention to the oft-neglected imperative mandate. Combining elements of both direct and representative democracy, the imperative mandate allows us to retain a commitment to citizens as active political agents without abandoning representation in favor of direct democracy.
On these grounds, I reconstruct the imperative mandate as an anti-elitist institutionalization of representative democracy. Implementing the imperative mandate renders the political process as follows: (1) citizens interact in primary assemblies where representatives are appointed and equipped with binding instructions; (2) these representatives meet in regional and national assemblies where they act on the instructions from their constituents; (3) citizens can, at any moment, vote to recall their representative if they use their discretionary powers in ways that run counter to their instructions.
As such, the imperative mandate is an anti-elitist representative institution because, although it recognizes the need for representation on both pragmatic and epistemic grounds, it maintains that representatives are always subjugated to the wishes of their constituents. Hence, representation becomes what it ought to be—a practical tool for democratic governance in large and complex societies—and sheds all it ought not to be, namely a foil for quasi-aristocratic rule by independent representatives.

Author

• Rasmus Møller Hvid, Aarhus University