(iPoster) Policy Accumulation and Performance Limits in Multilevel Governance

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence; Policy Challenges and Innovations; & Institutional Constraints and Government Performance in Multilevel Systems
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Institutional Constraints and Government Performance in Multilevel Systems

Abstract

Policy experimentation through pilot programs has become a core instrument of contemporary governance across a wide range of political systems. Governments increasingly deploy pilot programs to test policy reforms, manage uncertainty, and enhance administrative performance under conditions of complexity and institutional change. Existing scholarship in public administration and intergovernmental relations has largely emphasized the positive functions of policy experimentation, highlighting mechanisms such as policy learning, institutional innovation, and adaptive governance. By contrast, a fundamental yet underexplored question remains insufficiently addressed: how does governance performance evolve as policy pilots accumulate over time within multilevel governance systems?

Using original panel data covering Chinese cities from 2018 to 2023, this study examines the relationship between the cumulative number of digital governance policy pilots and local governance performance. The empirical results reveal a robust inverted-U relationship. In the early stages, an increase in the number of policy pilots is associated with improvements in governance performance. However, beyond a certain threshold, further accumulation of pilots generates diminishing returns and ultimately leads to declining performance. This non-linear pattern remains stable across alternative model specifications and the inclusion of time fixed effects.

The analysis further investigates the role of vertical intergovernmental support in shaping this relationship. Provincial policy support is conceptualized as a form of institutional scaffolding that alleviates coordination costs and administrative burdens faced by local governments. The findings indicate that stronger provincial support does not eliminate the inverted-U relationship. Instead, it systematically shifts the location of the turning point and moderates the steepness of the performance decline. In cities receiving higher levels of provincial support, diminishing returns emerge at a later stage, and the subsequent decline in performance is less pronounced. Vertical support thus modifies the timing and intensity of marginal returns without altering the underlying non-linear structure of the relationship.

To further clarify the institutional mechanisms at work, the paper examines heterogeneity across cities with differing coordination capacities. The moderating effect of provincial support is significantly stronger in cities with larger populations and higher coordination demands. This pattern suggests that vertical support is particularly consequential in administrative contexts characterized by greater organizational complexity, where coordination challenges are more acute.

This study argues that policy pilots are not costless additions to local governance systems. As the number of pilots increases, local governments confront rising coordination burdens, administrative complexity, and risks of institutional overload. Rather than producing linear performance gains, policy accumulation may generate diminishing returns and eventually undermine governance outcomes. These dynamics are especially salient in multilevel systems, where local governments must simultaneously respond to multiple pilot initiatives initiated by higher-level authorities.

By shifting analytical attention from isolated pilot effects to the cumulative consequences of policy experimentation, this study contributes to research on federalism and intergovernmental relations in three respects. First, it identifies the performance limits of experimentalist governance in multilevel systems. Second, it demonstrates how vertical support reshapes policy–performance dynamics without resolving the underlying trade-offs inherent in policy accumulation. Third, it offers a general framework for understanding when and why policy experimentation may become counterproductive. Although the empirical analysis focuses on digital governance pilots in China, the theoretical implications extend to other political systems in which pilot-based governance constitutes a central institutional strategy.

Author

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