(iPoster) Pessimism and Political Agency in Rousseau's "Emile"

• In Event: Poster Session: Foundations of Political Theory I

Abstract

As pessimism becomes more popular among political theorists, many worry about its potential to undermine political agency. I advance an original interpretation of Rousseau’s Emile to argue that such concerns are too simplistic. The pessimism of Emile attempts to locate the precise limits of human agency to render its use easier and more meaningful. Rather than discouraging political action, Rousseau’s pessimism means to focus it upon the struggles that he considers most impactful. Thus the politics of Emile focuses on everyday actions that alleviate suffering rather than larger projects of systemic change.

Since Joshua Foa Dienstag (2006) argued that pessimism describes a rich and useful tradition of political theory, a variety of philosophical pessimisms have flourished. They include Afro-Pessimism (Sexton 2016; Wilderson III 2020), ecopessimism (Witlacil 2023; Svoboda 2025), heteropessimism (Seresin 2019), hopeful pessimism (van der Lugt 2025), and a number of fresh arguments about the inevitability of suffering and the futility of human life (Ligotti 2010; Thacker 2015; Benatar 2017; Thacker 2018). Yet scholars remain wary of pessimism.

Many still argue that pessimism dispels human agency. Some say it resembles what Walter Benjamin (2005 [1931], 425-426) called “left-wing melancholy,” an attitude that leads to “complacency and fatalism.” Jennifer Hochschild (2017, 16) has warned political scientists about the dangers of “left pessimism” and its tendency to form a discipline that “gives up on human agency.” Michael C. Dawson (2021) writes similarly that “Afropessimism serves as a basis for political demobilisation rather than mobilisation.” And Melvin Rogers (2023, 4) claims that, in the analysis of Afro-Pessimism, “[h]uman agency dissolves altogether.” In short, pessimism discourages action. By robbing the future of its redemptive possibilities, it leaves humans with no sense of agency or purpose. It engenders despair, resignation, and political withdrawal. Or so the argument goes.

Some pessimists, by contrast, have defended their work as an attempt to find the precise limits of human agency and encourage action within these limits. Dienstag (2006, 267) writes that pessimism “admits limits to, not defeat of, human aspirations.” It “is not despair about the future but encouragement to meet its challenges within the limits of the human condition” (Dienstag 2020, 146-147). And Jared Sexton (2016) writes: “There is no rejection of the notion of agency in advance, but rather an endeavor to think rigorously about its conditions of possibility.” Yet these explanations offer no clear description of the sorts of actions that pessimists believe are possible and useful.

Jeffrey Edward Green (2024) goes further in his recent book on Bob Dylan. He reveals how pessimism can motivate the very actions that progress can suppress. In a 1979 song, Dylan describes progressive political ambitions as useless dreams inspired by the “counterfeit philosophies” of Marx, Kissinger, and others. “When you gonna wake up?” he asks listeners. “When you gonna wake up and strengthen the things that remain?” (quoted in Green 2024, 254-255). For Dylan, “strengthening the things that remain” means working to alleviate the suffering of society’s most disadvantaged. “Politics,” he says, “could be useful if it was used for good purposes. For instance, like feeding the hungry and taking care of orphans” (quoted in Green 2024, 282). Thus his message, according to Green (2024, 255), “is not one of utter despondency, but rather a call to achieve, through the very acceptance of a pessimistic view toward the world, an enlightened mentality and strategy of action.” Dylan’s call to action makes his pessimism seem unique. But it is not. Nor is the connection between pessimism and this kind of political action. Many pessimists believe that— precisely because the world is likely to remain a place of terrible injustice—they should focus on alleviating suffering today rather than planning for a better world tomorrow. A rich example of this pessimism lies neglected in the very canon of political thought.

Rousseau’s Emile promotes a distinctively pessimistic politics that eschews government and focuses instead on everyday actions that alleviate suffering. Pessimism is a philosophy that believes in severe limits to human agency. Rousseau teaches Emile these limits not to discourage him from acting but to focus his actions. Rather than pursuing social change or better government, Emile works to alleviate the suffering of the most disadvantaged members of his community—poor farmers, sick peasants, grieving mothers, and many more. And Rousseau ends Emile’s political education with a strikingly pessimistic assertion: “Freedom is in no form of government” (1959-1995, 4: 857). This cryptic line encapsulates the pessimistic politics that my paper will uncover and situate within the scholarly literature on Rousseau, pessimism, and political agency.

Author

• Tom Pattiz, University of Pennsylvania