(iPoster) Rational Theory of Incitement

• In Event: Poster Sessions: IR Theory; Experiments; Presidents and Executive Politics; & Political Cognition, Crisis, and Conflict Attitudes
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: IR Theory

Abstract

When and why would a state provoke war between a rival and a third party, and why would the rival take the bait? This article develops a rational theory of “incitement.” A state will pursue incitement when it confronts long-term security deterioration but believes an immediate war would bleed its rival dry. The strategy involves signaling strong backing of a third party while slowly delivering military support. This combination creates a “window of opportunity” that tempts the rival to attack before the third party becomes too strong, while also locking the third party into a defiant stance. The theory is corroborated by Bayesian process-tracing of the origins of World War II in Europe and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and scrutinized by formal and operations analyses.

Author

• Deye Kevin Li, University of Notre Dame