(iPoster) Defending an Objectivist Conception of Political Legitimacy

• In Event: Poster Sessions: International Security II & Normative Political Theory
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Normative Political Theory

Abstract

This paper argues that a moderate form of objectivism is worth taking seriously as a foundation for political legitimacy. According to objectivism, facts determine the rightness and wrongness of actions, regardless of whether these facts are accessible or whether they require actions that are feasible or reasonable. Objectivism is challenged by perspectivism, which instead holds that we should take agents’ epistemic perspectives into account when determining what they ought to do. While objectivism is popular in metaethics, an objectivist account of political legitimacy has rarely been defended, nor is objectivism commonly endorsed in political philosophy more generally. Instead, perspectivism dominates, either explicitly or implicitly.

My aim is to provide considerations in light of which an objectivist conception of political legitimacy gains plausibility points compared to conceptions based on perspectivism. Since both objectivism and perspectivism are metaethical views, I take my point of departure from a moralized conception of political legitimacy in order to facilitate a comparison between them. Accordingly, I assume that political legitimacy is a moral property that characterizes morally permissible political actions. I begin my defense by introducing thought experiments that, I argue, align more closely with our intuitions and therefore provide pro tanto support for an objectivist view of political legitimacy.

The main concern against an objectivist conception of political legitimacy, however, is related to its settling function. Some normative properties are ideals that we, through deliberation, aim to fulfill regardless of whether they are accessible, feasible or reasonable (such as truth), whereas other normative properties—such as political legitimacy—not only have this orientation function but also the function of settling what we should believe or do under specific circumstances. The worry is that conceptions of political legitimacy based on objectivism cannot fulfill this settling function, since moral rightness and wrongness, on objectivism, are determined by facts regardless of whether these facts are accessible or require actions that are feasible or reasonable.

I respond to this concern by showing how an objectivist conception of political legitimacy can fulfill its settling function through a series of distinctions. By distinguishing between wrongness and blameworthiness, we can explain how individuals can be wronged without any agent being blameworthy, thereby avoiding counterintuitive conclusions about blaming people for violating moral norms of which they were unaware. By distinguishing between moral principles that are and are not constrained by ability, objectivists can avoid infeasible obligations, such as an obligation to instantly eliminate starvation or end all wars in the world. At the same time, by distinguishing between perspective-independent and perspective-dependent duties, an objectivist conception of political legitimacy can address concerns about requiring politically unreasonable actions without abandoning objectivism’s core commitments.

While the accommodation of these distinctions moderates objectivism, I argue that they do not violate its core commitments. This allows me to present a defensible conception of political legitimacy grounded in objectivism. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between an objectivist conception of political legitimacy and democratic decision-making. On objectivism, the legitimacy of political actions is based on facts rather than determined by political will, which may seem worrying from a democratic perspective. To mitigate this concern, I point to the compatibility between objectivist conceptions of political legitimacy and epistemic conceptions of democracy, according to which democratic deliberation and procedures aim at discovering, rather than determining, what we should do. Hence, concerns about democracy should not stop us from taking objectivist conceptions of political legitimacy seriously.

Author

• Henrik Friberg-Fernros, University of Gothenburg