(iPoster) Client Loyalty and Public Approval of the Patron's Defense Commitment Decisions

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Formal Political Theory & Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Foreign Policy II – Alliances, Coercion, and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Abstract

In asymmetric alliances, the patron state’s decision to defend or abandon its client during crises has important implications, especially for states that rely on security guarantees. Existing alliance commitment theories mostly overlook how perceptions of client loyalty might shape public attitudes toward defending a client. This paper investigates whether perceived client loyalty influences public approval of the patron’s defense commitment decisions. Using a survey experiment focused on the U.S.-Turkey alliance, the study examines how manipulated information about Turkey’s loyalty affects American public support for defending or abandoning Turkey in a hypothetical crisis. Although Turkey is a NATO member, some recent actions have raised concerns about its loyalty among U.S. elites, making it a compelling case. The study tests three hypotheses: (1) Defending a disloyal client will lead to lower public approval than defending a loyal one; (2) Abandoning a loyal client will lead to lower public approval than abandoning a disloyal one; (3) The domestic audience cost of alliance commitment failure - measured as the approval gap between defending and abandoning - will be smaller for a disloyal client compared to a loyal one. Findings can shed light on the relationship between ally loyalty, public opinion, and honoring alliance commitments.

Author

• Selen Dogan Kosterit, Purdue University