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Nuclear latency, which is often operationalized as the ability to produce plutonium or enriched uranium, provides states with the capacity to build nuclear weapons relatively quickly in the event of a crisis. Although scholars have been interested in the potential impacts of nuclear latency on security outcomes, their studies provide competing results. While nuclear latency optimists argue that nuclear latency brings deterrence and bargaining benefits to a state, nuclear latency pessimists contend that it increases the likelihood of sanctions and military conflicts instead. Nevertheless, past works rely on a binary measure of nuclear latency, in which they conceptualize nuclear latency based on having at least one enrichment or reprocessing facility. This measurement treats all latent nuclear powers as equivalent, even though these states greatly differ in their level of nuclear latency. This paper shows the importance of differentiating between degrees of nuclear latency when discussing its impact on security outcomes, and relies on an ordinal nuclear latency variable. The study tests two hypotheses: (1) Possessing a higher level of nuclear latency increases a state’s deterrent capacity; (2) Possessing a higher level of nuclear latency increases a state’s ability to obtain stronger security reassurance signals from great powers. Findings help clarify the debate between nuclear latency optimists and pessimists by revealing non-linear effects, suggesting that different stages of latency influence security dynamics in distinct ways.