(iPoster) Constitutional Crisis: Definition, Patterns, and Consequences

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence; Policy Challenges and Innovations; & Institutional Constraints and Government Performance in Multilevel Systems
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence

Abstract

“Constitutional crisis” is everywhere. In 2025 alone, the term described events in the United States, Israel, South Korea, Bangladesh, Turkey, and dozens of other countries. Politicians invoke it liberally and legal scholars warn of it constantly, yet nobody agrees what it means. Fearing a meaning saturation or conceptual imprecision, some have opted for alternatives like “constitutional hardball” (Tushnet), “constitutional rot” (Balkin), or “constitutional revolution” (Jacobsohn and Roznai). These frameworks capture important dynamics but sidestep what constitutes a constitutional crisis itself. Where scholars do address crisis directly, the focus remains on single-country episodes without developing comparative theory.

This paper develops constitutional crisis into a rigorous analytical category. Drawing on an original dataset of over 350 crisis episodes across 160+ countries (1867-2025), I define constitutional crisis as occurring when political actors advance incompatible claims to constitutional authority and the constitutional order lacks the capacity or legitimacy to resolve them, producing institutional paralysis or extra-constitutional action. Conflict alone doesn't create crisis. Crisis emerges when constitutional norms fail to command compliance and normal procedures cannot determine winners.

The paper begins by discussing what constitutional crises do (e.g., generating new norms, renegotiating power distributions) and why studying them matters.The first part presents the dataset’s scope and coding framework. Episodes are coded across trigger type (e.g., parliamentary dissolution, judicial reform, dual executives, succession disputes), primary actors, regime type, duration, resolution pathway (e.g., breakdown, intervention, reform, negotiation), and violence escalation.

The second part examines in detail five paradigmatic cases spanning near-crises, brief episodes, and extended constitutional crisis: Poland (2015-23 “judicial standoff”), Venezuela (2017-19 “dual executives”), Kenya (“2007-08 post-election violence”), Israel (2023 “judicial reform”), and the United States (2020-21 election dispute). The analysis reveals patterns invisible in single-country studies and explains systematic differences between democracies and hybrid regimes in crisis triggers, escalation dynamics, and resolution pathways.

The third part outlines research directions the dataset enables: identifying which constitutional design features correlate with crisis frequency, mapping how institutional exit options and international constraints shape escalation dynamics, investigating public opinion on constitutional crisis or the role of elites, and examining whether constitutional crises predict democratic backsliding, coups, or civil conflict.

This matters for understanding democracy under threat. Constitutional crisis as a category differs from the broader “crisis of democracy” debate, yet the two often intersect. Constitutional crises can precipitate democratic breakdown, as seen recently in Kuwait and Tunisia, where political standoffs enabled autocrats to exploit constitutional ambiguity and justify power grabs. Understanding when and how constitutional crises resolve therefore provides essential tools for protecting and rebuilding democracy.

Author

• Ahmed Elbasyouny, Indiana University