(iPoster) Ambition, Discipline, and Elite Loyalty: Evidence from Taiwan

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Law and Courts & Elections and Voter Behavior
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Elections and Voter Behavior

Abstract

This paper uses principal-agent theory to address a puzzle in party politics: why do ambitious politicians (agents) remain loyalty to their party (principal) when a clear opportunity for self-interested career advancement arises? Rational choice theory suggests that a recall election against a fellow party member offers an ideal political promotion opportunity for ambitious local elites, incentivizing them to shirk their mobilization duties.

I test this proposition by examining the 2025 legislative recall election in Taiwan, which I argue provides a unique quasi-experiment setting. This context mitigates a key methodological challenge in the literature: the confounding effect of presidential coattails in general elections. To address the severe selection bias inherent in such observational data, I employ a propensity score matching (PSM) design on a village-level dataset. Contrary to the self-interest hypothesis, the findings provide robust evidence for the party discipline mechanism. Villages within the sphere of influence of “star councilors” exhibit a statistically significant and positive protective effect in the anti-recall vote share compared to their matched counterparts.

This result aligns with the core prediction of my game-theoretic model: when long-term party rewards for loyalty outweigh the uncertain gains from opportunism, loyalty becomes the rational equilibrium strategy. This study’s contribution is twofold. Empirically, it provides a rigorous causal estimate of the reverse coattail effect in a clean observational setting. Theoretically, it integrates formal theory with a quasi-experimental design to explore the mechanisms of loyalty, leveraging a crucial case to address the universal tension between collective party goals and individual ambition.

Author

• Yi-Hung Chen, National Taiwan University