(iPoster) The Politics of Protection: Security Assistance and Democratic Erosion in the Sahel

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

The Sahel has become one of the most militarized regions in the contemporary international system, characterized by persistent insurgency, transnational armed violence, and repeated military interventions in politics. Over the past decade, democratic governance across the region has deteriorated sharply, culminating in a series of coups and the consolidation of military-led regimes. These developments have unfolded within a dense landscape of international security assistance, counterterrorism partnerships, and external military engagement. While such interventions are often framed as necessary responses to insecurity, their cumulative political effects on civil–military relations and democratic institutions remain insufficiently understood.

Existing international security scholarship has produced a rich body of work on counterterrorism, security assistance, and military capacity-building in fragile states. However, much of this literature evaluates effectiveness primarily through operational or tactical outcomes, paying limited attention to how sustained external security engagement reshapes domestic power balances and political authority. This paper addresses this gap by examining how international security assistance contributes to democratic backsliding by reconfiguring civil–military relations in the Sahel. It asks: How do external security partnerships affect the political autonomy of armed forces, and under what conditions do they enable military actors to emerge as dominant political authorities rather than subordinate instruments of civilian rule?
The paper advances the argument that prolonged security assistance, particularly when prioritized over governance reform and accountability, can unintentionally empower military institutions as central political actors. By enhancing coercive capacity while weakening civilian oversight, external security support alters incentive structures within the state, lowering the costs of military intervention in politics. In contexts of declining legitimacy and persistent insecurity, armed forces increasingly position themselves as guarantors of national survival, thereby justifying coups, transitional rule, and the suspension of democratic norms.

Methodologically, the study employs a qualitative research design combining process tracing and comparative analysis across Mali and Niger. The empirical focus centers on major international security frameworks operating in these contexts, including the G5 Sahel, EUTM Mali, EUCAP Niger, and MINUSMA. The analysis draws on policy documents, military cooperation agreements, academic publications, elite interviews, and secondary sources to trace how different forms of security assistance intersect with domestic institutional trajectories. The expected findings suggest that international security engagement, when detached from robust civilian control mechanisms, contributes to the erosion rather than the protection of democracy.

The paper will proceed as follows. It will first situate the argument within the international security literature on security assistance and civil–military relations. It will then develop a theoretical framework linking external military support to political authority and regime outcomes. The empirical sections will Mali and Niger comparatively. The conclusion will reflect on the implications for rethinking international security strategies aimed at protecting and rebuilding democracy under conditions of chronic conflict.

Authors

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